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1 Introduction
A large literature in economics and political science has investigated the effect of natural
resources on political and economic development (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001; Mehlum
et al., 2006a,b; Voth and Drelichman, 2008; Haber and Menaldo, 2011). These studies have
delivered rather mixed results, and a general consensus has not emerged on whether, ulti-
mately, resource abundance should be viewed as a “blessing” or as a “curse”.1 But what
factors explain why the discovery of valuable resources can lead to desirable outcomes in
some countries (e.g. Norway, Australia) and to deleterious ones in others (e.g. Nigeria, Zim-
babwe)? The quality of pre-existing political and legal institutions is arguably important:
when institutions are dysfunctional, conflict over access to resource rents is likely to esca-
late, giving rise to increased corruption, rent-seeking, and even violence (Skaperdas, 2002;
Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Similarly, the literature on organized crime (Gambetta, 1993;
Konrad and Skaperdas, 2012) has argued that the combination of weak institutions and re-
source abundance can be conducive to the emergence of mafia-type organizations, which can
have profound and long-lasting effects on a country’s economic prospects.
The socio-economic consequences of organized crime have been a subject of growing
interest among academics and policy-makers alike (Jennings, 1984; Fiorentini and Peltz-
man, 1997; Skaperdas, 2001). Research on the topic has focused, in particular, on the study
of mafia-type organizations operating in various parts of the world.2 While these contribu-
tions have expanded our knowledge of the nature and structure of such organizations, their
economic origins remain largely unexplored.
Our paper attempts to fill this gap advancing the hypothesis that, when public law-
enforcement institutions are weak or absent, a boom in the value of natural resources signif-
1See Frankel (2010) for a comprehensive survey on the topic.
2Relevant contributions on mafia-type organizations by sociologists include Gambetta’s seminal work on
the Sicilian mafia (1993), Varese’s studies of the Russian mafia (2005), and of the Japanese Yacuza. Recent
contributions by economists have looked the economic impact of the Sicilian mafia (Pinotti, 2011) and the
workings of criminal networks in the context of the American mafia (Mastrobuoni and Patacchini, 2011).
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icantly contributes to the emergence of mafias, because it creates both a demand for private
protection and opportunities to extract rents through extortion, two dimensions along which
mafia-type organizations have a comparative advantage, thanks to the coordinated use (or
threat) of violence (indeed, protection and extortion are often hard to disentangle, and they
appear as the two sides of the mafia coin). While this argument can potentially be applied to
a variety of mafia-type organizations around the world, we empirically test it for the specific
case of the Sicilian mafia, the oldest and most notorious mafia, which dates back to the XIX
century and which has had a considerable and long-lasting effect on Sicily’s socio-economic
development.3 After the demise of feudalism and the collapse of the Bourbon Kingdom,
Sicily was characterized by a severe lack of state enforcement of law. At the same time,
the value of its sulfur reserves boomed, due to a sharp increase in sulfur demand from in-
dustrialized countries. Due to abundant and superficial availability, Sicilian sulfur extraction
correspondingly rose, up to the point that, by the end of the XIX century, Sicily was cover-
ing more than 80% of the world sulfur market. Since the actual shock to the value of natural
resources depended on sulfur presence, we exploit the exogenous distribution of sulfur re-
serves across Sicilian municipalities to document how such shock significantly contributed
to mafia’s emergence. As it will be clear throughout the rest of the paper, we do not claim
that sulfur was the sole cause of the emergence of Sicilian mafia. What we claim is that
the effect of sulfur on the emergence of mafia is the only one (i) clearly identifiable and (ii)
empirically robust.
While documenting the magnitude of the shock and defending the exogeneity of its dis-
tribution is relatively straightforward, establishing that municipalities that experienced such
a shock were ex-ante similar to those that did not is a more demanding task. One crucial
difficulty lies in excluding that differences in the availability of natural resources are corre-
lated to differences in other dimensions (e.g. institutional quality), which may affect mafia’s
3Lupo (1993) and Dickie (2004) provide an excellent account of the history of the Sicilian mafia and of its
expansion to other regions of Italy and to the United States.
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emergence through other channels. To address this concern, we pursue several strategies.
First, we document that differences in sulfur reserves are not correlated with population
growth rates in previous centuries. Since in the context of a Malthusian regime popula-
tion represents a good indicator of the degree of economic development, this is indicative
of the fact that sulfur played no special economic role prior to the XIX century. Second,
in our econometric analysis we control for a wide range of observables that are likely to
be correlated with institutional quality, economic activity and geographic and demographic
differences. Indeed, we employ a comprehensive dataset, which combines various measures
of early mafia’s diffusion across Sicilian municipalities with detailed information on natural
resource endowments and a range of other geographical and socio-demographic characteris-
tics. Third, in all our specifications we include area fixed effects, which allows us to identify
our main effect from variations in sulfur endowment within small areas, which are plausibly
homogeneous along several non-observable dimensions. Finally, following Acemoglu et al.
(2012), we perform additional tests of our hypothesis based on the comparison of pairs of
neighboring municipalities with different sulfur endowment.4
Our empirical findings provide strong support for our main hypothesis. In particular, we
find that sulfur availability has a positive and significant effect on early incidence of mafia
activity. Our findings are robust to the use of different measures of early mafia incidence,
to the introduction of a number of geographical and socio-economic controls, and to the
use of the complementary approaches discussed above. We also discuss and test alternative
explanations of the emergence of the Sicilian mafia proposed in the literature which, how-
ever, do not appear to find strong support in the data. In addition, none of the alternative
explanations we test are clearly identifiable, so that we can spot, at most, correlations among
early mafia emergence and these supposed explanations. Although the focus of our analysis
is on mafia’s emergence, in the last part of the paper we also document the existence of a
4Acemoglu et al. (2012) employ this strategy to estimate the effect of gold-mines-related slavery in Colom-
bia. One advantage of our application is that we do not have to worry about the endogeneity of slavery, since
we are directly interested in the effect of natural resources.
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strong correlation between historical and current mafia presence, and discuss the possibility
of using historical sulfur availability as an instrument for the latter.
Although specific to the case of the Sicilian mafia, we believe that our findings can be
helpful to inform our understanding of the rise of mafia-type organizations in various dif-
ferent parts of the world, where similar economic and institutional conditions may have
occurred.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates our theoretical
framework and relates our work to the literature on mafia-type organizations and resource
curse. In section 3 we discuss the socio-economic and political conditions of XIX century
Sicily that favored mafia’s emergence, with particular regard to the collapse of the Bourbon
regime and the upsurge in sulfur’s value. In section 4 we present the data used in the empir-
ical analysis, while in section 5 we describe our empirical strategy and discuss our findings.
Section 6 concludes.
2 On mafia and resource curse
Our research first relates to the vast literature on the socio-political impact of natural re-
sources. This literature has discussed various mechanisms through which resource abun-
dance may ultimately be regarded as a “curse”: vast resources may fuel violence, theft and
looting (Skaperdas, 2002), they may be used to finance rebel groups, warlords or civil wars
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2002), or may favor the emergence of criminal organizations aiming to
extract part of the wealth derived from their exploitation. Although some evidence suggests
that resource-rich countries display worse economic performance than resource-poor ones
(Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001), no unanimous consensus on this matter has emerged (see
for example Haber and Menaldo, 2011). In fact, as some observers have pointed out, whether
5It is the case, for example, of Yakuza in Japan, the Triad in Hong Kong and the Russian mafia. Indeed,
Yakuza had its origins after the demise of the feudal system in Japan, while the Russian mafia after the disso-
lution of the USSR.
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natural resources may result in a “curse” or a “blessing” may crucially depend on a country’s
institutional quality (Mehlum et al., 2006a,b).6 In the presence of weak institutions, our argu-
ment goes, natural resources are particularly vulnerable to predatory attacks; in this context,
the (illegal) use of violence provides mafia-type criminal organizations with a competitive
advantage in the supply of protection and extortion (Gambetta, 1993; Konrad and Skaper-
das, 2012), resulting in the capacity to extract a substantial portion of natural-resource-based
rents.
Our data structure, that exploits within-country variations in natural sources availability,
has the advantage of downsizing a plausible effect of natural resources on institutions (a
possible confound), since the latter are often designed at national level. Although studies that
use this data structure (such as Caselli and Michaels (2012) and Naritomi et al. (2012), both
using municipality-level data for Brazil) have to renounce to some degree of external validity,
the possibility to pin down the existing institutional framework is of great importance.
This research integrates two previous econometric studies that have looked at the his-
torical emergence of the Sicilian mafia. The first one, by Bandiera (2003), uses a common
agency model to formalize the idea that the mafia should have been historically more active
in towns were land was more fragmented, and finds support for this hypothesis using quali-
tative data from an 1885 parliamentary survey (Damiani, 1885) on 70 districts (mandamenti)
in western Sicily.7 The second one, by Pazzona (2010), expands Bandiera’s sample to 160
observations, documenting that the mafia was more likely to emerge where the competition
by new social actors was harsher, particularly in areas where land value was higher and land
holdings larger, at the opposite of what Bandiera (2003) finds. We improve upon these con-
6Institutional quality may, in turn, depends on features as diverse as geographic isolation, ethnic divisions,
or state collapse (Skaperdas, 2011).
7The argument is based on the idea that the purchase of protection by a single landowner imposes a negative
externality on the other ones (since it deflects thieves on their properties), and that, hence, landlords will be
competing with each other to acquire protection and to exclude others from it. By increasing the number
of competing landlords, land fragmentation should increase mafia’s potential profits. We present and discuss
in detail in the data section the parliamentary survey employed by Bandiera (2003) and the administrative
jurisdictions in XIX century Sicily.
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tributions by expanding the scope of the analysis to a much larger and more detailed set of
geographical units covering the entire island; this allows us to investigate the large differ-
ences in mafia incidence across Sicilian areas, which is considered one of the most puzzling
questions about the history of the Sicilian mafia.8
More in general, the results of this research complement the literature on the emergence
of persistent social institutions as the consequence of what can be viewed as a ‘historical acci-
dent’ (Acemoglu et al., 2001), which in the context our our study would be represented by the
sudden rise in international demand for Sicilian sulfur. Although geographical characteris-
tics per se are not the focus of our study, the findings we present can also be interpreted in the
context of the debate on the long-term impact of geography on socio-economic development.
Previous research has documented that the environment can influence economic performance
directly, through its effect on health and agricultural productivity (Landes, 1998; Sachs and
Malaney, 2002), and indirectly, by setting the conditions in which social norms and political
institutions have formed (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Durante,
2009; Nunn and Puga, 2012; Michalopoulos et al., 2012) or by defining environmental con-
straints to population growth (Galor and Weil, 2000). The evidence presented here suggests
that, under given economic circumstances, geographic characteristics may have contributed
to the emergence of particular forms of social organizations (criminal ones in this case),
which have persisted over time and continue to have relevant socio-economic effects.
3 Historical background
XIX century Sicily presented the two conditions that, according to the “resource curse” argu-
ment discussed above, are conducive to mafia’s emergence: poor quality of law-enforcement
institutions and soaring value of domestic natural resources. In what follows we discuss
some aspects of the XIX century Sicily political and socio-economic context that are rele-
8This aspect has been discussed by historians, sociologists and economists alike. Some examples include
Lupo (1993); Gambetta (1993) and Sylos Labini (2003).
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vant to our analysis, with particular regard to the main sources of institutional weakness, and
the impact of growing international demand for Sicily’s high-value mining production.
3.1 Institutional weakness and economic development
Two major political transformations characterized the history of Sicily during the XIX cen-
tury: the demise of feudalism in 1812, and the collapse of the Bourbon’s domination in 1861.
Both these events contributed to the disruption of Sicilian law enforcement institutions and
the deterioration of property-rights security.
Feudal barons had long been struggling with the monarchy, which imposed on them a
heavy fiscal burden, and this struggle intensified when, in 1806, in an attempt to escape from
the French, the Bourbons moved from Naples to Palermo, Sicily’s capital. At the beginning
of the XIX century most of Sicilian municipalities were under barons’ direct jurisdiction;
however, most feudal lords did not reside in their lands but in Palermo, the center of the is-
land’s political, economic and social life.9 Their lands, together with their feudal rights, were
generally rented out to local administrators (gabelloti), who were in charge of managing the
landholding’s productive activities and who invested their own capital in it. The abolition of
feudalism represented a profound institutional change, which officially transferred all feudal
jurisdictions to the State. Yet, while barons’ control over their lands had been weakened,
limits to the power of the monarch had also been imposed by the establishment of a parlia-
mentary system that assigned to the Parliament - largely dominated by the barons - extensive
powers of control over the King’s acts (Candeloro, 1956). The power struggle between land-
lords and the Bourbons continued until 1861, when the kingdom collapsed and its territories
were annexed to the newly formed Italian State. This institutional struggle resulted in ex-
tremely low levels of law enforcement, a situation which did not improve under the unified
State.
9The port of Palermo was by far the more trafficked in the Island. In 1838, on a total of 480 Sicilian
merchant vessels that left for foreign ports, 240 were from Palermo, while only 65 from Messina, the second
port in order of importance (Petino, 1958).
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The feudal economy was primarily agrarian, based on extensive cultivations (mainly ce-
reals) and characterized by very low productivity and peasants’ extreme poverty. The aboli-
tion of feudalism had little de facto impact on land distribution and did not result in increased
productivity (Blok, 1966, 1969). The most valuable productions were particularly exposed
to predatory attacks from local bandits (briganti), and the lack of law enforcement by the
State triggered the demand for private forms of protection. Where this demand emerged,
the supply of individuals specialized in the use of violence was abundant, and information
about potential customers as well as suppliers’ reputation flew quickly. In the countryside,
gabelloti were surrounded by a number of guards, former soldiers and former convicts, all
trained in the use of violence, who, formerly employed by feudal lords, were now looking for
new job opportunities. Local networks of such individuals quickly emerged: extremely well
informed about the local context - about potential victims of violent predation and potential
perpetrators alike - they were in the position to establish a credible reputation as effective
protectors. In the words of Franchetti (1876), this process led to a “democratization of vio-
lence”. As the violent threats used to protect their “clients” could also be used to intimidate
them, early mafiosi were in a position to create their own demand; as a consequence, the dis-
tinction between supply of protection and threat of extortion was generally unclear. Indeed,
various forms of agreements linked briganti and mafiosi, as the latter used the threat of the
former to justify the services they offered.10
3.2 Sulfur
The case of the sulfur industry represents one of the clearest examples of how, in the ab-
sence of effective public law-enforcement institutions, a florid market for private protection
emerged. Sulfur mines were usually rented out employing gabelloti, as it happened in agrar-
ian estates. Again, this was done to secure the right to exploit sulfur mines under the threat
10Moreover, private protection exerts negative externalities on those who are not protected, since it deflects
the threats toward them, as in Bandiera (2003). This is another way in which supply creates its own demand.
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of violent attacks. In particular, the working environment that developed within sulfur mines
was conducive to different forms of violence. The absence of law enforcement, which char-
acterized in Sicily in the XIX century, was exacerbated in the underground life of sulfur
caves, with controversies between workers usually solved using violence or its threat: a set
of laws regulating within-mines penal responsibilities was approved only in 1893. Due to
the lack of organized law enforcement, each miner had to protect his extraction from other
miners, as raw material extracted by miners was usually paid only once a week and the
material extracted each day was two or three times worth the daily wage of a worker. For
the protection of their material, miners were supported by carusi, 10-15 year old boys who
helped workers move extracted material and who, in this lawless environment, developed the
specific characteristics of a mafioso: use of violence, non-cooperation with others, code of
silence, etc.11
Once extracted, sulfur minerals - largely produced for export purposes - had to be trans-
ported to Palermo or other ports, so cargoes’ safety along the way had to be ensured as well.
Starting in the first decades of the XIX century, international demand for sulfur soared, as
this represented a fundamental intermediary input for industrial and chemical productions,
which were quickly expanding both in Britain and France.12 For all of the XIX century
and during the first decade of the XX century, Sicily represented the world’s largest sulfur
producer, accounting for up to 83% of world sulfur production in 1893.13
The increase in international demand for sulfur determined an increase in the value of its
protection favoring mafia’s emergence. To identify this effect, our empirical analysis exploits
11Since in the empirical part we find strong evidence of sulfur presence as predictor of mafia, as opposed
to no effects of citrus cultivation, which shares similar commercialization characteristics, we speculate that the
real driver of mafia’s emergence was the underground part of the story.
12In 1855 over 70% of Sicilian sulfur was exported to France and Great Britain (Squarzina, 1963). Sulfur is
the base of oil of vitriol, and of almost all the acids and alkalis which are extensively used in various manufac-
turing processes. It is also required for the manufacture of gunpowder as well as for the production of various
medicines (Rawson, 1840). Even if industrial substitutes for sulfur have been discovered and developed since
the late 1840s, the use of sulfur gained again momentum because of its use in grape cultivation as a fungicide.
Still in 1940 sulfur accounted for 20% of Sicily’s total export value (Pescosolido, 2010).
13Sicilian sulfur production and export almost coincided since, throughout the XIX century, virtually no
sulfur-intensive industries were active in the region, letting aside its use in grape cultivation.
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exogenous variations in the availability of sulfur across Sicilian municipalities. It is worth to
stress that Sicilian sulfur was mainly superficial (Squarzina, 1963; Cancila, 1995) and hence
no considerable investments were required to find and extract it, so the information on the
presence of sulfur mines proxies very well the presence of sulfur itself. Key to our identifica-
tion strategy is the assumption that the presence of sulfur reserves was unimportant for local
economic activity prior to the XIX century. Available evidence on Sicily’s sulfur export is
consistent with this view: as shown in figure 1 Sicilian sulfur exports, virtually negligible
at the beginning of the XIX century, reached almost 500 thousands tons by the beginning
of the XX, accounting for about 6% of Sicilian GDP. Export growth was especially marked
during the years comprised between the 1830s and the 1850s when it reached an astonish-
ing 9% annual rate.14 According to Kutney (2009), sulfur in 1852 was the top export from
Sicily (392,000 British Pounds) before citrus fruits (362,000), olive oil (163,000) and wine
(106,000). All these factors contributed to increase sulfur producers’ demand for protection
both around the mines and possibly along the routes connecting them to the main ports.
Not surprisingly, the Brotherhood of Favara, the first documented mafia-type criminal
organization, was discovered in 1883 in the heart of sulfur-producing Sicily (see Dickie,
2004). The discovery of this organization led to the arrest of more than 200 affiliated (on
a total of more than 500 arrested), 107 of whom were convicted in the following trial. Of
these 107, 72 were workers, at different layers, of the sulfur industry, coming from two rival
factions, which found in the Brotherhood a way to achieve power in the market of protection
in the context of sulfur extraction.
It is important to mention that the export of Sicilian sulfur rapidly declined over the
first part of the XX century; this was mainly due to the development of new extraction
technologies, which made it cheaper to exploit previously untapped deep reserves in other
parts of the world, thus reducing the comparative advantage of Sicilian superficial sulfur
14We focus on export volumes because, around the 1830s, prices experienced considerable fluctuations due
to the establishment and the subsequent dissolution of a monopoly (they remained relatively stable afterwards).
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Figure 1: Export of Sicilian sulfur
Note: Thousands of tons of sulfur exported from Sicily. Sources: Squarzina (1963),
Cancila (1995) and various entries of Treccani Encyclopedia.
mines.
4 Data
To test the main predictions of our theoretical argument, we look at differences across Sicil-
ian municipalities. To do so, we use historical data on the presence of the mafia and on the
availability of sulfur in the late XIX century, as well as data on a wide range of geographical
and historical controls. In what follows we describe the data sources and discuss how the
variables used in the empirical analysis are constructed.
4.1 Mafia
Our primary source of data on the early diffusion of the mafia in Sicily is represented by the
work of Cutrera (1900). Former law-enforcement official and one of the major experts of
12
the phenomenon of the time, Cutrera collected detailed information on the intensity mafia’s
activity in 285 Sicilian municipalities in the last decades of the XIX century. In particular,
for each municipality, Cutrera assessed the intensity of mafia activity on a four-point scale
ranging from none, to low, intermediate and high. Cutrera’s data have been extensively used
in previous historical and sociological studies on the Sicilian mafia, including Gambetta’s
seminal contribution (1993). An alternative source of information on the early incidence of
mafia activity is represented by the Damiani-Jacini parliamentary enquiry (Damiani, 1885).15
This was part of a nation-wide inquiry conducted between 1881 and 1885 with the primary
aim of collecting information on the conditions of the peasantry under the newly unified
state.16 In addition to extensive municipal-level information on a variety of agriculture-
related variables, the Damiani-Jacini inquiry contains information on the intensity of mafia
activity in 158 Sicilian districts (mandamenti).17 This information was collected through
a questionnaire transmitted to lower court magistrates (pretori), who were asked to assess
the intensity of the activity of the mafia in their district of jurisdiction on a four-point scale
analogous to the one used by Cutrera.18
We believe that Cutrera’s data are preferable to Damiani-Jacini’s for several reasons.
First, unlike Damiani-Jacini’s, Cutrera’s data are available at the municipal level and cover
15An additional source is the Borsani-Bonfadini parliamentary enquiry on the conditions of Sicily conducted
between 1874 and 1876. However, this inquiry only reports the 43 municipalities (out of 357) in which the
mafia appears to be more widespread. Given its limited scope, we do not use these data in our empirical
analysis.
16The inquiry started in 1881 and was completed at the end of 1884. The main questionnaire on the condi-
tions of the agrarian class was transmitted to all Sicilian mayors on May 20th 1883. A complete version of the
questionnaire can be found at page V, volume XIII, tome II, fascicle IV of the official inquiry report.
17Post-unification Sicily was characterized by four levels of administrative division: the largest was the
province, followed by the department (circondario), the district (mandamento), and the municipality (comune).
Overall, Sicily was divided into 7 provinces (Caltanissetta, Catania, Girgenti, Messina, Noto, Palermo, Tra-
pani), 24 departments, 179 districts and 357 municipalities.
18The jurisdiction of low court magistrates coincided with the district; hence their assessment of the activity
of the mafia reported in the Damiani-Jacini inquiry has to be understood as referring to the entire district area,
and not just to one or more municipalities within the district. This aspect has generated some confusion among
users of the Damiani-Jacini’s data (Bandiera, 2003; Pazzona, 2010; Dimico et al., 2012), who appear to have
erroneously interpreted the information on the activity of the mafia as referring to the municipal rather than
the district level. This confusion can probably be attributed to the presence, in most districts, of municipalities
with the same name as the district they are part of (e.g. municipality of Messina in the district of Messina,
municipality of Girgenti in the district of Girgenti, etc.).
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the large majority of Sicilian municipalities (about 80%), allowing for a more extensive and
finer empirical assessment of the relationship between sulfur availability and early mafia ac-
tivity. One important drawback of the Damiani-Jacini’s data is that the reported level of mafia
activity is solely based on the subjective assessment of respondents and is therefore suscep-
tible to differences in the evaluation criteria adopted by local officials. Actual unawareness,
fear of retaliation or contiguity with the mafia would, for example, bias respondents towards
underreporting the level of mafia activity in their jurisdiction, introducing a measurement
error. As discussed in Pazzona (2010), the problem would be even more severe if such fac-
tors were themselves correlated to actual mafia activity (or to its determinants). Cutrera’s
measure is likely to be less vulnerable to this concern. On the one hand, there is no reason to
believe Cutrera would employ different evaluation criteria when assessing the level of mafia
activity in different municipalities. On the other hand, given his position of outside observer,
it is reasonable to think that Cutrera’s assessment of mafia activity would be relatively un-
responsive to the specific incentives faced by local officials (and, indirectly, to the actual
strength of mafia activity). We therefore believe that the use of Cutrera’s measure would
mitigate the empirical problems discussed above, although we do not claim that it eliminates
them. Although our empirical analysis will primarily rely on Cutrera’s data, we will also test
the robustness of our findings using the Damiani-Jacini’s district-level data. In what follows,
we indicate with maf c and maf d, the index of mafia intensity based respectively on Cutrera
and Damiani-Jacini.
The geographical distribution of the Sicilian mafia in the late XIX century, based respec-
tively on Cutrera’s and Damiani-Jacini’s data, is depicted in Figure 2. Relative to Damiani-
Jacini, Cutrera’s data indicates that the mafia was more present in the Western part of the
island, particularly in the areas around Palermo and Agrigento. This pattern, largely con-
sistent with numerous reports from historians and early mafia experts (see Lupo, 1993 and
Sylos Labini, 2003 among others), is further reassuring on the accuracy of Cutrera’s data.
14
Figure 2: Geographic distribution of the Sicilian mafia in the late XIX century
(a) Cutrera (b) Damiani-Jacini
The figure reports the assessment of the intensity of mafia activity according to Cutrera (left) and
Damiani-Jacini (right), with darker colors indicating more intense mafia’s activity (missing values
are reported in white). Cutrera’s data are at the municipality level while Damiani-Jacini’s are at the
district level. Missing values correspond to cases for which it was not possible to match historical
municipalities (or districts) to current ones, e.g. for municipalities created in the XX century.
4.2 Sulfur and other geographical and historical controls
With regard to the presence of sulfur, comprehensive municipal data are available from
Squarzina (1963). These include information on the number of sulfur mines in each Sicilian
municipality in 1886 - that is, around the pick of Sicily’s sulfur export boom. Since we are
interested in gauging the original stock of sulphur available in each municipality - hence prior
to the intense depletion which took place throughout the XIX century - we consider those
mines that were still operating in 1886 as well as those that were already exhausted by then.
It is worth emphasizing, once again, that Sicilian sulfur was generally superficial so that its
extraction was relatively unchallenging and did not require considerable investments; as a
consequence, at the peak of Sicily’s sulfur export boom, virtually all major sulfur reserves
on the island had been tapped (Squarzina, 1963). In light of this fact, the presence of sul-
fur mines can be considered a good proxy for the exogenous distribution of sulfur reserves,
which is ultimately our variable of interest. The number of sulfur mines in each municipality
(labelled sulfur henceforth), is summarized in Figure 3.
In our empirical analysis we control for a range of other geographical and historical
15
Figure 3: Geographic distribution of Sicilian sulfur mines (1886)
The figure reports the number of sulfur mines (both active and exhausted) recorded in each
Sicilian municipality in 1886 on a four-color scale: 0 (lighter gray), 1-10, 11-30, more than
30 (darker gray).
variables at the municipal level. We focus, in particular, on factors that may have influenced
the demand and supply of mafia services and, at the same time, may be correlated with the
presence of sulfur, in order to be sure that our variable of interest reflects the effect of sulfur
availability on mafia’s emergence and is not merely proxying for other characteristics.
To account for differences in topography, we control for terrain ruggedness and elevation.
As discussed by Nunn and Puga (2012), in addition to its obvious effect on agricultural pro-
ductivity and trade, rugged terrain - in the form of hills, caves and cliffs - provides lookout
posts and hiding places for individuals trying to escape. Arguably, in the context of Sicily
rugged areas provided outlaws with better protection from police forces. This view is con-
sistent with accounts by various historians; for example, when discussing the widespread
presence of the mafia in the mountainous towns of Gangi, Lupo (1993) emphasizes the im-
portance of the town’s impervious location, which made it particularly difficult for law en-
forcement officers to establish control over the surrounding area and apprehend criminals. To
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account for this aspect, we include in our regressions a municipal measure of terrain rugged-
ness constructed from the Global Land One-km Base Elevation Project (GLOBE), a global
gridded digital elevation data set covering the Earth’s surface at a 10-minute spatial resolu-
tion (approximately 1 km).19 Relatedly, we also control for difference in elevation within
a given area, a variable which has been identified in the literature as imposing significant
limitations on both agriculture and breeding activities (Michalopoulos, 2012; Grigg, 1995;
Lupo, 1993). In particular, we use data on the maximum difference in altitude in a given
municipality available from the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
We are also interested in controlling for the suitability of local land for various types of
crops, as this is likely to have affected the demand for protection of agricultural goods. In
fact, while some low-value crops (i.e. cereals) were consumed locally, others (e.g. citrus
fruits, olive, sumac) were high-value export goods which might demand a degree of protec-
tion similar to that of sulfur. To account for this aspect, we include in our regressions mea-
sures of land suitability for the three most widespread crop categories in XIX century Sicily:
i) citrus fruits, ii) cereals, and iii) olives. These measures are constructed using data on crop-
specific agro-ecological suitability available from the IIASA-FAO Global Agro-Ecological
Zones project (GAEZ).20 The GAEZ data are in grid format, have a very high resolution (1’),
and assign to each grid cell a value from 0 (totally unsuitable), to 100 (very suitable). To ob-
tain suitability measures at the municipality level we average the individual suitability score
of all the cells in a given municipality. We focus on crop suitability - determined in large part
by exogenous soil properties and climatic conditions - rather than on actual crop production
to minimize concerns of possible reverse effects of mafia’s presence on the prevalence of par-
ticular crops. 21 Given the importance of irrigation for several of the crops mentioned above,
19The GLOBE data set has superseded the GTOP30 which, before the introduction of GLOBE, was consid-
ered the most accurate digital elevation data set and had been used, among others, by Nunn and Puga (2012).
20More information on the FAO-GAEZ project can be found at http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at/. Data from FAO-
GAEZ have been used extensively by economists in recent years to investigate a variety of topics. Examples
include Nunn and Qian (2011), Michalopoulos (2012) and Durante (2009).
21In the on line Appendix, to test one of the alternative hypothesis about mafia’s emergence, we use infor-
mation on the proportion of land devoted to the cultivation of citrus fruits in each municipality, available from
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and in light of the accounts of various observers about the crucial role played by the mafia
in controlling water supply, we also control for the relative scarcity of water in a given area
using data on the presence of underground water basins available from the Sicilian Waters
Observatory.
Another set of controls is intended to capture factors such as access to major ways of
communication and proximity to the main ports, which were arguably important determi-
nants of the value of protection. The first variable, labelled as postal roads, indicates whether,
at the beginning of the XIX century, a municipality had direct access to one of the postal
roads which connected Sicily’s largest towns. The data are derived from the digitalization
and geo-referencing of a detailed historical map of Sicily in late XVIII century (Cary, 1799),
hence prior to the steady rise in sulfur’s international demand. Other variables include the
distance of a municipality’s centroid from the closest non-seasonal river (river distance), and
distance from the closest commercial port (port distance).22
We also control for a set of socio-economic and demographic characteristics, which could
potentially be related to both sulphur availability and mafia presence. In particular, to account
for the fact that crime incidence might be higher in more densely populated areas (Glaeser et
al., 1996; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999; Buonanno et al., 2012) we control for a measure of
population density (density) based on data on municipal population from the 1861 census.23
Relatedly, to control for possible differences between rural and urban areas, we also define a
dummy variable, urban, indicating whether a municipality is located within a 10 Km distance
from one of Sicily’s then five largest cities.24
the Damiani-Jacini inquiry.
22Sicily’s main commercial ports were: Mazara del Vallo, Porto Empedocle, Trapani, Siracusa, Catania,
Palermo and Messina.
23By 1861 Sicily’s total population amounted to 2.1 million, accounting for more than 10% of Italy’s pop-
ulation. Population density was more than 81 inhabitants per squared kilometer, roughly comparable to the
current density of Spain. Since then, the increase in population has been rather homogeneous across Sicilian
municipalities, resulting in a correlation between population in 2001 and in 1861 of of 0.95. Palermo, the
capital, was Sicily’s largest and denser city, with a population of 185,000 inhabitants and a density of 1,000
inhabitants per squared kilometer, comparable to that of current mid-size Italian cities.
24These include: Palermo, Catania, Trapani, Messina and Girgenti.
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Finally, we also control for the degree of land fragmentation, a factor which previous con-
tributions have related to the development of a florid market for private protection and the
consequent emergence of the mafia (Bandiera, 2003). Information on the degree of land frag-
mentation in each municipality is available from one of the questionnaires of the Damiani-
Jacini’s inquiry, in which mayors where asked to report whether land in their municipality
was prevalently composed by small, medium or large landholdings. In particular, we de-
fine a dummy variable, fragmentation, taking value one for municipalities where small and
medium landholdings were prevalent, and zero in those in which large landholding still ex-
isted. Due to the rather low response rate to this question, data on fragmentation are available
for only 237 out of the 285 municipalities in our sample.
The availability of data at the municipal level allows us to include in all our regression
department fixed effects, which capture the political and historical background common to
all municipalities in the same department. In particular, since in the period under exami-
nation the Sicilian administrative, judicial and law-enforcement systems were organized at
department level, the inclusion of 24 department fixed effects allow us to estimate the effect
of sulfur on mafia by comparing municipalities characterized by a fairly homogeneous levels
of institutional quality. Descriptive statistics on all variables are reported in Table 1.
5 Empirical Analysis
This section presents the empirical assessment of how geographical variations in sulfur en-
dowment contributed to the emergence of the Sicilian mafia. As discussed above, over the
XIX century Sicily experienced the collapse of the Bourbon Kingdom and a generalized sit-
uation of weak law enforcement. Over the same century, international demand for sulfur
soared and most of the world supply came from Sicily. Municipalities with sulfur reserves
thus experienced a boom in the value of their natural resources.25 We exploit the exogenous
25As already shown in figure 1, sulfur export in Sicily grew at an impressive rate of 9% throughout the
period 1830 and 1860 and in that period Sicily served around 90% of the world sulfur demand. sulfur export
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distribution of sulfur reserves to identify the effects of such boom on mafia’s emergence. We
document a resource curse, by which valuable natural resources fostered protection demand
and extortion opportunities, thus favoring the emergence of organized crime.
As a preliminary check, we present some evidence corroborating the idea that sulfur did
not play any relevant economic role before the XIX century, so that any ex-ante differences
between sulfur-rich and sulfur-poor municipalities are not driven by sulfur presence. Before
1800, the Sicilian economy was arguably characterized by a Malthusian regime, in which
development is meaningfully proxied by population growth. For all municipalities for which
we have population data for the XVII and the XVIII century, Table 2 reports OLS regres-
sions of average population growth on initial population (in log) and on sulfur.26 The three
columns refer to population growth in each century and in the whole period, respectively.
Sulfur is never significant, confirming its irrelevance for previous economic development.
Together with the already documented fact that sulfur exports were negligible at the begin-
ning of the XIX century, this evidence is our first and preliminary step to tackle the issue of
ex-ante similarity of municipalities with and without sulfur. In the following analysis, we
tackle such issue in many additional ways.
5.1 Municipality-level estimates
Table 3 provides our first clear evidence of the importance of sulfur for mafia’s emergence.
It reports municipality-level OLS estimates of our preferred mafia measure (maf c) on the
number of sulfur mines (sulfur). The different columns gradually increase the number of
control variables.27 Column 1 shows that, in a univariate regression (including a constant, as
all regressions in all tables), the estimated coefficient on sulfur, significant at the 1% level, is
was negligible at the beginning of the XIX century, peaked at the end of that century (reaching 540,000 tons in
1901) and sharply declined in the XX century (by 1976, it was only 85,000 tons).
26Data for population of Italian towns between 1300 and 1861 are available from Paolo Malanima at:
http://www.paolomalanima.it/DEFAULT files/Page646.htm
27Since maf c is an ordinal variable, we also estimate an ordered probit model; when doing so we obtain
analogous results (available upon request).
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equal to 0.033, implying that a one standard deviation increase in sulfur leads to an increase
in maf c by more than one sixth of a standard deviation.28 Column 2 adds department fixed
effects. This is our first step in tackling the issue of whether differences in sulfur endowment
pick up differences in other variables, which may matter for mafia’s emergence. Such fixed
effects control for any characteristics that were common within a department. The result
shows that, even within each department, municipality-level variations in sulfur endowment
are positively and significantly associated to variations in early mafia’s presence (the point
estimate is 0.022 and it is significant at the 1% level).
To minimize the risk that within-department variations in sulfur endowment are related
to differences in other variables, which may themselves be related to mafia activity, columns
3 to 7 progressively add municipality-level controls for differences in agriculture, geography,
transportation and communication, socio-demographic variables and land fragmentation (al-
ways including department fixed effects). No matter which controls we include, sulfur re-
mains highly significant and the magnitude of the coefficient is barely affected, suggesting
that our main result is not driven by any omitted variable.29
The first group of additional control variables contains exogenous soil characteristics,
which are related to agricultural activity: column 3 includes soil suitability for cultivation of
citrus fruits, cereals and olives, as well as a dummy for water scarcity. It is important to con-
trol for such factors because many scholars have argued that mafia’s emergence was related
to citrus cultivation (Lupo, 1993; Gambetta, 1993; Dickie, 2004; Del Monte and Pennacchio,
2012; Dimico et al., 2012) and also to mafia’s possibility to control scarce water resources
and thus have high extortionary power towards agricultural production (Sylos Labini, 2003).
Both suitability for cereals and for citrus have a significant effect, the former positive and the
latter negative, but only the former effect remains significant as additional controls are intro-
28Given the linearity implied by the measure of mafia activity, it takes 30 mines more to have an increase in
mafia activity from one level (not present, presence is low, intermediate, high) to the next.
29The coefficient on sulfur is only raised when we add land fragmentation to the controls. Yet, notice that
this reduces sample size from 282 to 237 municipalities since, as discussed in the previous section, information
on fragmentation are available only for 237 municipalities.
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duced. These results do not support the widely held idea that early mafia’s development was
related to citrus cultivation. Column 4 adds two geographic controls: average ruggedness and
difference in elevation (Nunn and Puga, 2012; Michalopoulos, 2012). Ruggedness is never
significant, while difference in elevation is strongly significant and positive. Column 5 adds
the presence of 1799 postal roads, as well as distance from the closest non-seasonal river
and from the closest commercial port. Mafia’s presence was significantly higher in munic-
ipalities along old postal roads, whereas distances from rivers and ports are not significant.
Column 6 further adds population density in 1861 and a dummy for urban municipalities.
Such variables are related to the level of economic activity, both legal and illegal (see, e.g.
Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999; Buonanno et al., 2012). In line with the literature, we find
that population density is positively and significantly related to mafia’s emergence. Finally,
column 7 adds land fragmentation, which according to Bandiera (2003) should be relevant
for mafia’s emergence, but we find no support for her thesis.
A common concern in the resource curse literature is that results may be driven by out-
liers. To address this aspect we replicate our econometric analysis excluding the two mu-
nicipalities with a disproportionately high number of sulfur mines, and, alternatively, using
a robust estimator which down-weighs observations with large residuals using the Huber
weight function. In both cases, the magnitude of the coefficient on sulfur increases and is
estimated even more precisely, which suggests that, if anything, our results are tempered by
the presence of outliers30. As an additional robustness check, we estimate our baseline re-
gression using instead of the number of sulfur mines (sulfur) a dummy (sulfur d) that equals
one for those municipalities with at least one sulfur mine. Using sulfur d is important be-
cause we do not have information on the quantity of sulfur extracted in each mine and we
therefore put ourselves in the worst case scenario, that is we do not exploit at all the infor-
mation on the intensive margin in the distribution of sulfur. Table 4 reproduces the same
30Both sets of results, not shown here, are available upon request. The two municipalities are Enna and
Caltanissetta which display respectively 61 and 52 sulphur mines.
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specifications of Table 3, but it substitutes sulfur d (the dummy for the presence of at least
a sulfur mine in a municipality) for sulfur. For the sake of space, we only report the coef-
ficient of sulfur d. Results show that, even if we neglect the information on the intensive
margin of sulfur extraction and only rely on the extensive margin, the presence of sulfur is
still significant to explain mafia’s emergence. Yet, the slight decrease in significance levels
also suggests that the intensive margin was relevant as well.
5.2 District-level estimates
In our baseline regressions we used our preferred measure of mafia intensity, maf c, which
is available at the municipality level. In order to obtain estimates directly comparable with
other studies (Bandiera, 2003; Pazzona, 2010; Dimico et al., 2012), we employ the mafia
measure as defined in the Damiani-Jacini parliamentary inquiry, maf d, which is only avail-
able at district level, for 158 Sicilian districts.
We replicate the analysis proposed in our baseline regression, presented in Table 3, with
the same specification, but substituting maf d for maf c. Since estimates exploit district-level
information on mafia’s activity, we correspondingly re-define all our regressors at this level
of geographical and administrative aggregation. District-level findings are presented in Table
5. Throughout all regressions, the estimated coefficient on sulfur is strongly significant and
is extremely stable, suggesting that our results are not driven by either the specific mafia
measure used or by any omitted variable.
As previously stated, the use of maf d is not only useful as a robustness check, but it also
allows a more direct comparison with other contributions. In particular, Bandiera (2003),
who also uses district-level data, provides early evidence, based on 70 districts located in
the western part of Sicily, supporting the idea that land fragmentation may have favored
mafia’s emergence; while on the contrary Pazzona (2010) provides evidence that the origins
of the Sicilian mafia are rooted in the presence of large landholdings. Our results, both those
based on all the 158 available districts, as well as those presented in Table 3, based on 237
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municipalities, do not support their arguments.
5.3 Neighbor-pair fixed effects
So far we have presented consistent and robust findings, documenting the significant effect
of the presence of sulfur on mafia’s origins. Since sulfur is not randomly distributed across
Sicily, but rather geographically concentrated, we have relied on department fixed effects and
on municipality-level controls to make sure that differences in sulfur endowment do not pick
up the effects of some other characteristics, which may be relevant for mafia’s emergence.
In this section we go even deeper and, rather than comparing municipalities with different
sulfur endowments within a given department, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2012) and exploit
variations in sulfur endowments across direct neighbors.
In particular, we restrict our analysis to the 48 municipalities which have sulfur mines
and the 54 municipalities without sulfur mines which are adjacent to them.31 As in Ace-
moglu et al. (2012), we implement the neighbor-pair fixed effects estimator, very similar to
a matching methodology and to a regression discontinuity design, comparing each sulfur-
mining municipality to each of its direct neighbors without sulfur. Figure 4 visually presents
municipalities with sulfur mines and their neighbors.
This empirical strategy makes it possible to directly control for unobservables that are
common across adjacent municipalities by including neighbor-pair fixed effects. Indeed, we
rely on the assumption that adjacent municipalities faced similar institutional and contextual
conditions (i.e. law enforcement, state presence, culture, labor market, geography), and are
likely to be very similar across any other unobservables. Within the neighbor pair, we claim
that the exogenous source of variation in mafia’s activity is the presence of sulfur mines.
Formally (see Acemoglu et al. (2012) for a more complete description), we define with
S the subset of municipalities with sulfur mines and with N(s) all the adjacent municipalities
31Note that although 48 municipalities have sulfur mines, 13 of them have as only neighbors other munici-
palities with sulfur, so they cannot be exploited in this analysis.
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Figure 4: Municipalities with sulfur mines and their neighbors
Note: White municipalities are excluded from the analysis because both them and their neighbors
do not host sulfur. Light grey municipalities are those 54 without sulfur that have neighboring
municipalities with sulfur (the 35 in dark grey). Black municipalities are excluded because, even
if endowed with sulfur, they do not neighbor any non-sulfur municipality.
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without sulfur mines of each element of S. We use s and i to index municipalities with and
without sulfur mines, respectively. We estimate the following model by means of OLS:
maf cs = βsulfurs + γX
′
s + ψsi + νs s ∈ S (1)
maf ci = βsulfuri + γX
′
i + ψsi + νi i ∈ N(s) (2)
where X ′t collects municipality-level controls, ψsi represents common unobservables for
the neighbor pair (s,i) and νt represents municipality-specific unobservables (t = s, i).
Neighbor-pair fixed effects estimates are presented in Table 6. For simplicity we only present
the coefficient on sulfur, but consistently with Table 3 we progressively add all the controls
described in the previous section. The coefficient of sulfur in the neighbor-pair fixed effects
estimates is always significant and its magnitude is very close to our baseline findings, pro-
viding additional and compelling evidence on the role played by sulfur endowment in mafia’s
emergence.
5.4 Mafia’s persistence
Although the main purpose of our research is to shed light on the historical determinants
of mafia’s emergence, we are also interested in understanding to what extent these factors
have had persistent effect on the presence of the mafia today. In particular, we analyze
whether the incidence of mafia activities today is correlated with the presence of the mafia
in the early stages of its development. In order to pursue our goal we measure today’s mafia
intensity by means of several variables available at the municipality level: (i) dissolution of
municipal administration due to mafia infiltrations; (ii) seized firms and (iii) seized real estate
properties. We define a dummy that takes value one if the municipality council was dissolved
due to mafia infiltration over the period 1991 to 2011 (source: Ministero dell’Interno) and
two dummies equal to one, respectively, if at least a firm and at least a real estate/property
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have been seized by the Italian judicial authority in the municipality by the end of 2011
(source: Agenzia del Demanio).32 It is worth noticing that over the considered period more
than 10% of Sicilian municipalities were dissolved and firms and real estate properties were
seized in more than 23% and 44% of Sicilian municipalities, respectively. Moreover, we also
consider non-mafia related crime rates per 100,000 inhabitants at the municipality level as a
falsification test (source: Polizia di Stato, Ministero dell’Interno). Indeed, we might expect
that, given the strict territorial control exerted by the Sicilian mafia, property crime should be
unaffected or even lowered in municipalities with a stronger presence of mafia. We propose
a simple instrumental variable approach in which the first stage is the specification presented
in column 2 of Table 3 (i.e. maf c regressed on sulfur and department fixed effects) and the
second stage is a measure of crime today on the instrumented measure of historical mafia
(i.e., maf c). Instrumental variable estimates, presented in Table 7, show a strong effect of
early mafia on today’s mafia presence, confirming the persistence of the phenomenon over
time. Moreover, petty crime rates (i.e., theft, burglary, car theft and robbery) are in some
cases negatively affected by mafia’s historical presence, suggesting that mafia’s territorial
and social control acts as a deterrent of non-mafia-related crimes.
6 Conclusions
Under weak institutions, a boom in the value of natural resources may raise both the demand
for private protection and the opportunities for rent appropriation through extortion, thus fa-
voring the emergence of mafia-type organizations, since they have a competitive advantage
in such activities, and thus translating in a resource curse with potentially persistent conse-
quences. We empirically investigate the validity of this argument for the specific case of the
origins of the Sicilian mafia, which emerged in the mid XIX century, when the power vacuum
32Law n. 221 (July 1991) sets the rule for council dissolution due to mafia infiltration. Law n. 646 (Septem-
ber 1982), known as Law “Rognoni - La Torre” rules the seizure of firms and real estate properties belonging
to mafia-like organizations.
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created by the collapse of the Bourbon Kingdom coincided with the soaring international
demand for Sicilian sulfur. Our evidence, based on a newly collected municipality-level
dataset, shows a significant and robust effect of sulfur endowments on early mafia activity.
We claim this effect to be causal, since sulfur is exogenously distributed as any natural re-
source, it is easily discoverable in Sicily since it is mainly superficial, and until the beginning
of XIX it was commercially barely useful. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of several
controls, including fixed effects for small areas, to the use of different measures of sulfur
endowments, to the use of mafia measures at different aggregation levels and even to the
inclusion, in a RDD fashion, of fixed effects for pairs of adjacent municipalities, with and
without sulfur mines.
In addition to documenting the causal effect of sulfur endowments on the origins of the
Sicilian mafia, we review and further test the effect of alternative factors that have been
proposed as possible determinants of the emergence of the mafia, and show that, when ap-
propriately accounting for local fixed effects and other municipal controls, none of them
appear to display an empirically robust effect.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
maf c 282 1.433 1.140 0 3
maf d 158 .689 1.064 0 3
Sulfur 282 1.986 7.099 0 61
Sulfur dummy 282 .167 .373 0 1
Citrus suitability 282 15.608 7.658 0 48
Cereals suitability 282 17.728 11.149 1.490 66.380
Olive suitability 282 30.906 12.065 3.478 69.273
Water scarcity 282 0.702 0.458 0 1
Ruggedness 282 433.630 195.940 58.017 1,149.332
Diff. elevation 282 796.837 519.126 48 3,232
Postal roads 282 0.550 0.498 0 1
River distance 282 9.279 7.247 .992 42.075
Port distance 282 37.924 19.371 0.132 83.919
Urban 282 0.124 0.330 0 1
Density 282 132.412 126.861 4.856 1,177.986
Fragmentation 237 0.759 0.428 0 1
Note: Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis. Data is at the municipality
level except for maf d that is collected at the district level.
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Table 2: Growth regressions
Dependent variable: population growth
1600-1700 1700-1800 1600-1800
(1) (2) (3)
ln(population 1600) -.1660∗∗∗ -.0900∗∗
(.0576) (.0404)
ln(population 1700) -.0761
(.0608)
Sulfur .0003 -.0002 -.0002
(.0030) (.0028) (.0022)
Obs. 47 56 50
R2 .159 .029 .097
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian municipalities for which popula-
tion was positive in at least two of the years 1600, 1700 or 1800, according to Malanima’s data
(http://www.paolomalanima.it/DEFAULT files/Page646.htm). The dependent variable is the yearly population growth
while the explanatory variables are the log of population at the beginning of the period and Sulfur, the number of sul-
fur mines as collected by Squarzina (1963). Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table 3: Baseline estimates
Dependent variable: maf c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sulfur .0329∗∗∗ .0224∗∗∗ .0237∗∗∗ .0228∗∗ .0234∗∗ .0239∗∗∗ .0549∗∗∗
(.0105) (.0082) (.0089) (.0091) (.0092) (.0089) (.0127)
Citrus suitabiliy -.0251∗ -.0155 -.0235 -.0227 -.0293
(.0150) (.0151) (.0163) (.0166) (.0180)
Cereals suitabiliy .0235∗∗ .0223∗∗ .0224∗∗ .0224∗∗ .0296∗∗∗
(.0108) (.0108) (.0107) (.0110) (.0111)
Olive suitabiliy -.0037 -.0039 .0009 -.0016 -.0001
(.0119) (.0119) (.0131) (.0129) (.0145)
Water scarcity .1267 -.0460 -.0231 .0057 -.0548
(.1986) (.1990) (.1923) (.1933) (.2010)
Ruggedness -.0011 -.0010 -.0011 -.0006
(.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0009)
Diff. elevation .0004∗∗∗ .0004∗∗∗ .0005∗∗∗ .0006∗∗∗
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002)
Postal roads .0811 .0975 .1470
(.1008) (.1002) (.1127)
River distance .0101 .0045 .0091
(.0092) (.0094) (.0101)
Port distance -.0087 -.0034 -.0022
(.0060) (.0069) (.0080)
Urban .1855 .0925
(.1898) (.2133)
Density .0013∗∗∗ .0012∗∗
(.0005) (.0005)
Fragmentation .0961
(.1315)
Department FEs N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 282 282 282 282 282 282 237
R2 0.042 0.567 0.577 0.594 0.601 0.618 0.659
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian municipalities for which values for all the variables
are available. The dependent variable is maf c, the level of mafia activity at the end of XIX century as coded by Cutrera
(1900) on a 0 to 3 scale (0 is no mafia activity, 3 is large mafia activity). The main explanatory variable Sulfur is the
number of sulfur mines as collected by Squarzina (1963), while the other control variables are described in the main
text. Department fixed effects are included in all specifications except the first. Robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1%
significance level, respectively.
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Table 4: Baseline with sulfur dummy
Dependent variable: maf c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sulfur dummy .5532∗∗∗ .3594∗ .4501∗∗ .3968∗ .4165∗ .4916∗∗ .4550∗∗
(.1765) (.2193) (.2286) (.2370) (.2449) (.2237) (.2168)
Controls
Department FEs N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Suitability and water N N Y Y Y Y Y
Geomorphological N N N Y Y Y Y
Distances N N N N Y Y Y
Sociodemographic N N N N N Y Y
Fragmentation N N N N N N Y
Obs. 282 282 282 282 282 282 237
R2 0.033 0.559 0.570 0.587 0.593 0.613 0.639
Note: Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian municipalities, for which values for all the
variables are available. The dependent variable is maf c, the level of mafia activity at the end of XIX century as coded by
Cutrera (1900) on a 0 to 3 scale (0 is no mafia activity, 3 is large mafia activity). The main explanatory variable, Sulfur
dummy, is a dummy taking value one if the number of sulfur mines as collected by Squarzina (1963) is greater than zero,
while the other control variables are described in the main text. Department fixed effects are included in all specifications
except the first. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis
of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table 5: District level estimates
Dependent variable: maf d
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sulfur .0354∗∗∗ .0318∗∗∗ .0325∗∗∗ .0327∗∗∗ .0326∗∗∗ .0347∗∗∗ .0322∗∗
(.0080) (.0115) (.0116) (.0117) (.0121) (.0122) (.0127)
Citrus suitability .0413 .0483 .0444 .0399 .0378
(.0315) (.0324) (.0344) (.0351) (.0352)
Cereals suitability -.0034 .0024 .0022 .0042 .0016
(.0193) (.0188) (.0196) (.0197) (.0201)
Olive suitability -.0203 -.0203 -.0212 -.0207 -.0155
(.0180) (.0177) (.0198) (.0199) (.0210)
Water scarcity .2763∗ .2842 .2669 .2365 .2078
(.1678) (.1730) (.1711) (.1720) (.1820)
Ruggedness .0010 .0013 .0009 .0007
(.0002) (0.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Diff. elevation .0002 .0002 .0003 .0003
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Postal roads .2210 .2877 .2680
(.1906) (.1947) (.1993)
River distance .0026 -.0022 -.0040
(.0177) (.0182) (.0184)
Port distance -.0009 .0016 .0002
(.0126) (.0145) (.0144)
Urban -.1216 -.1115
(.4075) (.4097)
Density .0014∗ .0014∗
(.0008) (.0008)
Fragmentation -.1847
(.2467)
Department FEs N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 158 158 158 158 158 158 158
R2 0.105 0.232 0.249 0.259 0.266 0.283 0.288
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian districts for which values for all the variables are
included. The dependent variable is maf d, the level of mafia activity around 1883 as coded by Damiani (1885) on a 0
to 3 scale (0 is no mafia activity, 3 is large mafia activity). The main explanatory variable Sulfur is the number of sulfur
mines as collected by Squarzina (1963), while the other control variables are described in the main text. Department
fixed effects are included in all specifications except the first. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **
and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level,
respectively.
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Table 6: Neighbor pair fixed effect estimates
Dependent variable: maf c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sulfur .0206∗∗∗ .0172∗∗ .0231∗∗ .0216∗∗ .0196∗∗ .0207∗∗∗
(.0061) (.0073) (.0093) (.0094) (.0094) (.0055)
Controls
Department FEs N Y Y Y Y Y
Suitability and water N N Y Y Y Y
Geomorphological N N N Y Y Y
Distances N N N N Y Y
Sociodemographic N N N N N Y
Obs. 162 162 162 162 162 162
R2 0.054 0.637 0.667 0.672 0.681 0.795
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian municipalities for which values for all the variables are
available. Observations are all those municipalities that form a couple in which a municipality has sulfur and its neighbor
has not. Each municipality in a pair shares a common pair fixed effect. The dependent variable is maf c, the level of mafia
activity at the end of XIX century as coded by Cutrera (1900) on a 0 to 3 scale (0 is no mafia activity, 3 is large mafia
activity). The main explanatory variable Sulfur is the number of sulfur mines as collected by Squarzina (1963), while the
other control variables are described in the main text. Pair fixed effects are included in all specifications. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to
0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
39
Table 7: Persistence
Council Real estates Firms Theft Burglary Car theft Robbery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
maf c .0706∗∗∗ .1477∗∗∗ .1524∗∗∗ -183.9049∗∗∗ 3.1591 -28.3848∗∗∗ -2.2930
(.0187) (.0325) (.0277) (52.9439) (10.1428) (9.4874) (2.0695)
Obs. 282 282 282 282 282 282 282
Note: This table present the result of instrumental variable estimates in which the first stage is specification presented
in column 2 of table 3 (i.e. maf c regressed on sulfur and department fixed effects) and the second stage is a measure
of crime today on the instrumented measure of historical mafia (i.e., maf c). Today mafia presence is measured by: (i)
dissolution of municipal administration due to mafia infiltrations; (ii) seized firms and (iii) seized real estate properties.
Council is a dummy that takes value one whether the municipality council dissolved due to mafia infiltration over the
period 1991 to 2011 (source: Ministero dell’Interno), Real estates is a dummy equals to one whether at least a real estate
property has been seized by the Italian judicial authority and Firms is a dummy equals to 1 whether at least a firm has been
seized (source: Agenzia del Demanio). Theft, Burglary, Car theft and Robbery are crime rates per 100,000 inhabitants
for each Sicilian municipality (source: Polizia di Stato, Ministero dell’Interno). Robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1%
significance level, respectively.
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